We have experimentally demonstrated quantum key distribution with a heralded single-photon source. Numerical calculations have shown the advantages of this method such as larger key rates at longer distances.
Reliable single photon sources are highly required for secure key distribution. Coincidence property of spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) can be utilized in order to increase the communication distance. By getting coincidence between signal and idler we can substantially decrease the dark count probability and attain longer maximum distance. Here we utilize a heralded single-photon source (HSPS) generated by detecting one mode of SPDC. The most important features of the system are the availability of room-temperature operation, stability, and long-time operability guaranteed by nonlinear crystals robust against photo-damages. These are essentially required for the practical QKD. The experiment setup is shown in Fig. 1 . A pump laser of SPDC (430nm) from a frequency doubler (Spectra Physics, WAVE TRAIN) pumped by a cw-Ti:Sa laser (Coherent MBR-110, 1.6W) has the output power of about 13mW. The pump beam focused into a type-II BBO crystal (5×5 ×1mm) with a lens (f=100mm) was converted into a pair of collinear degenerate signal and idler. The generated photon pair was collimated with a lens (f=75mm.) After the pump beam was deflected by two prisms, the signal and idler were separated by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), and detection of reflected light (idler) with a photon detector (Perkin Elmer, SPCM-AQR-14) showed the existence of conjugate photon in another output path. Four states (horizontal, vertical, right circular, and left circular polarization states) necessary both in the BB84 and Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG) protocols were randomly encoded by EOM. Next, polarized signal was sent to Bob (receiver) by passing through a free space adopted as the quantum channel, and detected by Bob. The idler component was converted into electric signals and split. They were used triggers of a multi-channel 2-fold coincidence unit (Kaizu works, KN1250) with a coincidence window of 6.5 ns. Signal voltages from four detectors in the Bob's unit were used as the secondary inputs to the channels of the 2-fold coincidence unit. Then each output was injected into a digital oscilloscope (Tektronix, TDS7054). It had a record length of 2M and after the signal was recorded during a fixed time duration, this record was exported from the oscilloscope to a hard disc of Bob's computer. This procedure was repeated necessary times to generate a long key. All signals in one record of the oscilloscope could be used for key distillation by removing noise from signal inputs to the oscilloscope beforehand by taking coincidences between the trigger signal and the signal detected by the detectors 1-4 in the 2-fold coincidence unit. Even though the relatively wide window increased dark counts and hence quantum bit error rate (QBER), it was still sufficiently low enough to guarantee the secure and secret key generation. A sifted key is generated by basis reconciliation and sharing of secure and secret key can be achieved by doing error correction and privacy amplification. The number of detected events was 219 counts in 80 ms quantum transmission i.e. 20 times repetition of data acquisition in the digital oscilloscope) and 115 bits of sifted key in 80 ms was obtained by doing the base reconciliation. The number of errors was 3 in 80ms, and hence
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error rate was 0.026. The bit rate for the raw key was 2,737 bits/s. After basis reconciliation the number was reduced to 1,437 bits/s. Finally we can get secure and secret key by doing error correction and privacy amplification with QuCrypt 1 . Though we did not directly send the data to the software, we could simulate the final key length by substituting several parameters obtained from experiment. By using the raw key rate and the error rate the final key length was 1,083bits. We also demonstrate in several different attenuations corresponding to longer distances by inserting a variable neutral density filter into the quantum channel. The attenuation simulates only loss in the quantum channel and does not include the finite efficiency of detection apparatus. The results are shown in TABLE 1. The 1.5dB attenuation corresponds to 1km optical fiber transmission at 860nm. And for 1550nm it is 0.2dB/km, thus 10dB corresponds to 50km fiber transmission. Final key is the number of bits which were got from error correction and privacy amplification by using QuCrypt. TABLE 1. Bit rate and error rate vs quantum channel attenuation (dB). Now we show the results of calculations in Fig. 2 which give quantitative key rates after security is guaranteed against the photon number splitting attack which has been formulated by Lutkenhaus 2 . Fig.2 Transmission distance dependence of key rate logG. The wavelengths of trigger and signal are 860nm and 860nm, respectively. The loss of quantum channel (optical fiber at 860nm) is 1.5 dB/km, the quantum efficiency of Bob's detector is 0.5, the dark count probability is 5*10 -8 at the detectors of Bob and Alice, and the receiver loss is 2dB. Curves 1-3 are calculated by adopting SARG protocol and curves 4-6 are by BB84.
Solid lines 1,4 are the cases for a QKD system based on a laser source, dashed lines 2,5 are the cases for (efficiency of trigger detector) = 0.5 for a QKD with a heralded single photon source, and dotted lines 3,6 are for = 0.1.
The most essential point of the method exists in the increased key rate by several orders of magnitude near the cutoff distance where a smaller inclination is formed. The smaller inclination is the indication of the fact that two photon component can be included in this SARG protocol. Therefore we can attain a larger key rate in longer distances. We use one-and two-photon components of signals as a key. The result represents that even if the trigger detector's efficiency is quite low (0.1:dotted lines), it still permits the key distribution up to 40km. Furthermore the key rates of SARG around 40km are about four orders higher than those of BB84. In summary, we have demonstrated experimental quantum key distribution with a heralded single photon source. We can obtain single photon states easily by using this source and it shows better applicability for practical purpose. We have also shown the advantage of this source by calculation. It shows the usefulness of SPDC under very low detection efficiency. Furthermore we have verified the utility of SARG protocol. Although we have roughly analyzed here, it has shown several orders larger key rate in long distances than BB84. Quantum transmission phase of SARG is the same as BB84, so experimentalists can directly use the system which was developed for BB84 by simple modification.
